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Note 2018: This paper was originally published in Reports on Mathematical Logic 36, 2002, pp. 131–
141. I have recently noted that the proof of one of theorems in it was incorrect; it was also independently
discovered by Guillaume Massas (UC Irvine). This does not concern the main result claimed in the
title (Theorem 11), which seems unassailable, but rather my attempt to present the proof of Theorem
5, essentially due to Shehtman, without, as I say below, “a superfluous use of transfinite induction” (i.e.,
differing with the original paper [Sh77] and my own Master’s Thesis). My version of proof is fixable; I would
like to thank Guillaume for coming up with the idea. Hopefully, some of his work towards generalizing
such results will be published soon. Let us also note that Valentin Shehtman himself points out that
the proof in the 1980 paper [Sh80] or in his more recent Habilitation Thesis has already been simplified
compared with the one in the original reference [Sh77]. Apart from this crucial fix (and adjusting one
reference), I left this earliest paper of mine unchanged on principle, even though I was tempted to polish
up—at the very least—its style, narration and English.
Abstract
Although in 1977 V.B. Shehtman constructed the first Kripke in-
complete intermediate logic, no-one in the known literature has com-
pleted his work by constructing a continuum of such logics. After a
substantial reminder on how an incomplete logic can be obtained, I
will construct a sequence of frames similar to those used by Jankov
and Fine. None of these frames can be reduced by a p-morphism to
another; at the same time, there are no p-morphisms from generated
subframes of the Fine frame onto any frame from the considered se-
quence. All of the frames satisfy all of Shehtman’s axioms. Therefore,
by using the characteristic formulas of the frames from the sequence
it is possible to obtain the desired conclusion.
∗This article is based on a paper delivered at the 4th International Tbilisi Symposium
on Language, Logic and Computation (September 2001).
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In the 1970’s, a number of important, deep and technically complicated
results concerning relational semantics for modal logics was obtained by such
authors as S. Thomason, K. Fine, M.S. Gerson, R.I. Goldblatt, J. F. A. K.
van Benthem and W. Blok; it was the Golden Age of the subject, see [Bu82],
[Bu83] and [ChZ97] for references and summaries of the most important
works. The main goal of my paper is to draw attention to the fact that
many important results lack superintuitionistic analogues, although the task
of transferring them is highly nontrivial.
This gap may be partially due to the fact that Kripke semantics never
became as popular in the realm of intermediate logics as they are in the
realm of modal logics, which are more suitable and flexible tools to deal with
frames. There were fewer experts working on relational semantics for intu-
itionistic logics. In 1977, one of the most distinguished persons in the field,
V. B. Shehtman, constructed the first Kripke incomplete intermediate propo-
sitional logic. His construction was based mainly on a frame from [Fi74b],
but he very ingeniously used a formula introduced in [GdJ74]. Nevertheless,
he did not follow Fine’s suggestion that it seems to be possible to construct a
continuum of incomplete logics. Such a continuum of S4 logics was presented
in [Ry77] in the same year as Shehtman’s construction; it is known, however,
that the incompleteness of a modal logic does not imply the incompleteness
of its intuitionistic equivalent. In [On72] one may find the claim that there
exists a continuum of incomplete predicate superintuitionistic logics. Unfor-
tunately, this claim is given without proof; besides, it is far easier to construct
an incomplete predicate superintuitionistic logic than to construct an incom-
plete propositional superintuitionistic logic. It is truly surprising but up to
this day no-one has presented a proof that there exists a continuum of such
logics. I shall attempt to fill in this gap.
In this paper I shall try to conform to the standard definitions and sym-
bols which may be found, for example, in a monograph by Chagrov & Za-
kharyaschev [ChZ97]. Nevertheless, for the sake of convenience, let me re-
mind the most standard ones. Unless otherwise stated, by a logic I shall
mean a superintuitionistic (intermediate) logic.
Definition 1 A (Kripke) structure/frame consists of a set and a relation of
partial order F = 〈W,6〉.
Definition 2 A substructure/subframe of a structure F = 〈W,6〉 is a
frame G = 〈V,61〉 where V ⊆ W and 61 = V
2 ∩ 6.
Definition 3 A (Kripke) model is an ordered pair M = 〈F ,B〉 consisting
of a frame F = 〈W,6〉 and a function B from the set of propositional
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variables to the set of upward closed subsets of W . Valuation is extended to
all formulas in the usual way.
I would like now to introduce two technical notions, weaker than finite
approximability (finite model property) and stronger than completeness
Definition 4 A logic is fa-approximable iff the set of its theorems coincides
with the set of all formulas which are true in some class of rooted frames with
no infinite antichains.
Definition 5 A logic is ac-approximable iff the set of its theorems coincides
with the set of all formulas true in some class of frames with no infinite
ascending chains — Chagrov & Zakharayaschev call such orders Noetherian.
Professor A. Wroński has suggested that fa-approximability implies ac-
approximability. This would give rise to the following picture:
finite approximability ⇒ fa-approximability ⇒ ac-
approximability ⇒ completeness.
In my paper, I shall prove that there exists a continuum of propositional
logics even outside the broadest class, i.e. the class of all complete logics.
Nevertheless, first let me describe how an incomplete logic can be obtained
— it is an easy generalization of Shehtman’s method [Sh77].
Theorem 1 A logic L lacks ac-approximability iff its modal companion above
Grz τL is incomplete.
Proof. It is enough to recall that Grz is complete with respect to all
partial orders without infinite ascending chains. ⊣
Theorem 2 If there exists a rule of the form
(ψ ∨ (ψ → e(χ))) → χ
χ
(e is any uniform substitution) which is not admissible in some intermediate
logic, then this logic lacks ac-approximability and thus lacks the finite model
property.
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(ψ ∨ (ψ → e(χ)))→ χ
χ
ψ
ψ → e(χ)
ψ
(e(ψ) ∨ (e(ψ)→ e2(χ)))→ e(χ)
e(χ)
e(ψ)
e(ψ)→ e2(χ)
ψ
e(ψ)
(e2(ψ) ∨ (e2(ψ)→ e3(χ)))→ e2(χ)
e2(χ)
e2(ψ)
e3(ψ)→ e2(χ)
Figure 1: A model refuting χ but verifying ψ ∨ (ψ → e(χ)) → χ
Proof. (sketch) In any family of frames adequate for the logic (if there
exists such) there must be a frame validating
(ψ ∨ (ψ → e(χ))) → χ
with all substitutions (because the formula belongs to the logic) and refuting
χ under some valuation. It can be easily seen that such a frame must contain
an infinite ascending chain — see figure 1. ⊣
Corollary 3 If an intermediate logic satisfies the assumptions of theorem 2,
then its companion above Grz is incomplete.
Proof. A consequence of theorems 1 and 2. ⊣
In fact far more can be proved about such a logic — see my forthcoming
paper [Li02].
Theorem 4 If there exists a rule of the form
(ψ ∨ (ψ → e(χ))) → χ
ψ ↔ ς → τ
τ → e(τ)
χ
which is not admissible in a logic L, then in any class of frames adequate
for L (if there exists any) there must be a structure containing an infinite
comb or a willow (see fig. 2) as a substructure; thus, L must lack both ac-
approximability and fa-approximability.
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Proof. Similar to the proof of theorem 2 — see fig. 4. ⊣
Let me recall the celebrated Gabbay-de Jongh axioms [GdJ74]
bbn :=
n∧
i = 0
((pi →
∨
j 6= i
pj) →
∨
j 6= i
pj) →
n∨
i = 0
pi (n ≥ 1)
which are complete with respect to the class of all finite frames of branch-
ing n. It is well known that they can be refuted in the infinite comb. Never-
theless, not every frame containing the infinite comb as a substructure refutes
these axioms — see figure 3. Therefore the following theorem is nontrivial:
Theorem 5 If there exists a rule of the form
(ψ ∨ (ψ → e(χ))) → χ
ψ ↔ ς → τ
ς ∨ τ → e(ς) ∧ e(τ)
χ ↔ ψ ∨ e(τ)
χ
(1)
which is not admissible in some intermediate logic L, then in any class of
frames adequate for L (if there exists any) there must exist a structure re-
futing bbn(n ≥ 2). Thus, if L contains any of Gabbay-de Jongh axioms, it
must be incomplete.
Proof. It may be carried out in a manner similar to that of Sheht-
man [Sh77], but it is needlessly complicated, e.g. with a superfluous use of
transfinite induction. Therefore I would like to sketch a more elegant and
intuitive proof. Assume then that there is a frame F for L, a valuation V
and a point x in F such that x 2V χ. It is easy to check that x must be
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Figure 2: An infinite comb
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the root of the submodel of 〈F ,V〉 depicted by picture 4. Now let me define
a new valuation B based on V and inspired by figure 4: TML2018: Here
is where the original 2002 text is edited.
B(pi) :=
⋂
∀m∈ω n 6=3m+i
V(en(ψ)).
Axioms of L and Figure 4 ensure that sets B(p0), B(p1) and B(p2) are distinct
and non-empty. It is easily seen that the consequent of bb2 is refuted at x
under the valuation B. Now suppose that there is some y > x such that
some conjunct of the premise of bb2 is classically refuted at y, e.g.,
y B p0 → (p1 ∨ p2) (2)
and
y 2B p1 ∨ p2. (3)
(2) and (3) taken together imply
y 2B p0 ∨ p1 ∨ p2. (4)
We claim that
∃n ∈ ω y 2V e
n(χ). (5)
To see this, assume (5) does not hold, that is, en(ψ) ∨ en+1(τ) is V-satisfied
at y for every n. Pick the smallest m s.t. y 2V e
m(ψ); it exists by (3).
This means em+1(τ) must be satisfied, thus yielding y V e
m′(ψ) for every
m′ > m. As by the assumption on m we have the same for every m′ < m as
well, we thus contradict (4).
Hence, we can pick the smallest m s.t. y 2V e
m(χ). Note that for any
m′ ≤ m, y 2V e
m′(τ), and hence our assumption on m holds only if
for any m′ < m, y V e
m(ψ). We can find an infinite comb similar to
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Figure 3: A structure containing an infinite comb as a substructure where
Gabbay-de Jongh axiom bb2 is true
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ς
ψ e(ς)
ψ e(ψ) e2(ς)
ψ e(ψ) e2(ψ) e3(ς)
τ
e(τ)
e2(τ)
e3(τ)
χ
e(χ)
e2(χ)
e3(χ)
ψ
e(ψ)
e2(ψ)
Figure 4: A submodel of 〈F ,V〉 whose root refutes χ.
the one in Figure 4, but whose root this time is y and whose labelling is
obtained by replacing each formula in Figure 4 by its suitably iterated e-
substitution; think of the subframe generated by them-th point up the trunk.
It is consequently possible to find some (in fact, infinitely many) points from
this comb classically refuting p0 → (p1 ∨ p2), contradicting (2). ⊣
TML2018: The rest of the paper is left in the form it was
written in 2002.
It may be worth mentioning that rule 1 is as a matter of fact inspired
by the form of axioms in Shehtman’s later paper [Sh80]. In his paper from
1977 [Sh77] the axioms were more complicated and to make Shehtman’s 1977
theorem a consequence of theorem 5 — as I am going to do — rule 1 should
be replaced by the following one:
(ψ ∨ (ψ → e(χ))) → χ
ψ ↔ ς → τ
τ → e(τ)
χ ↔ ψ ∨ e(ψ)
e(ψ) → ψ ∨ e(τ)
χ
(6)
Now let me consider a family of formulas introduced by Shehtman:
β−1 := p, γ−1 := q,
β0 := q → p, γ0 := p → q,
βn+1 := γn → βn ∨ γn−1,
γn+1 := βn → γn ∨ βn−1,
αn := βn+2 ∧ γn+2 → βn+1 ∨ γn+1 (n ∈ ω),
η := α0 → α1 ∨ α2, ǫ := α0 ∨ α1,
δ := η → ǫ, κ := α1 → α0 ∨ β2.
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If ς stands for β2 ∧ γ2, τ stands for β1 ∨ γ1 and e is defined as follows:
e(p) := q ∨ (q → p), e(q) := p ∨ (p → q),
then the following observation allows me to use a variant of theorem 5
concerning rule 6
α0 is of the form ψ, i.e. ς → τ ,
ǫ is of the form χ, i.e. ψ ∨ e(ψ),
δ is equivalent to (ψ ∨ (ψ → e(χ))) → χ,
κ intuitionistically implies e(ψ) → ψ ∨ e(τ),
τ → e(τ) is an Int-tautology.
Of course, it would also be possible to use theorem 5 without any modi-
fication. In this case one should define ǫ as α0 ∨ β2 ∨ γ2 or even α0 ∨ β2,
δ as (α0 → α1 ∨ β3) → α0 ∨ β2 and no κ is needed at all. Nevertheless,
I am going to stick to the first paper of Shehtman to make references easier;
the paper from 1980 [Sh80] is less known.
Lemma 6 Axioms δ and κ are true in a structure known as the Fine frame
(see figure 5). Axiom bbn is true in a general frame based on the Fine frame
and generated by the two upward closed singletons. The same general frame
refutes axiom ǫ.
Proof. It is quite easy and may be found, for example, in [Sh77]. ⊣
Corollary 7 (Shehtman) An intermediate logic L determined by axioms
δ, κ, and bb2 is incomplete.
Proof. A consequence of theorem 5 and lemma 6. ⊣
Now I may construct a continuum of incomplete logics inspired by ideas
from Kit Fine’s classical papers [Fi74a], [Fi74b]. I will construct a sequence
of frames Fn (see fig. 6) very similar to the sequence from [Fi74a].
Lemma 8 For any n ∈ ω, Fn  δ ∧ κ ∧ bb2. Besides, Fn  ǫ.
Proof. The fact that the Gabbay-de Jongh axioms are true in all of
those frames is obvious. It is impossible to simultaneously refute α0 and α1
in any of the frames, which implies that Fn  δ ∧ ǫ. The validity of κ may
be shown in the same way as in case of the Fine frame. ⊣
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Figure 5: The Fine frame
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Figure 6: Frames F0, F1, F2, F3
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Lemma 9 For any n ∈ ω, there exists no p-morphism from any generated
subframe of Fn onto Fm (m 6= n). In other words,
Fn  β
#(Fm, ⊥)(m 6= n),
where β#(Fm, ⊥) is a Jankov formula for Fm.
Proof. It is similar to the one in [Fi74a] (by induction). ⊣
Lemma 10 For any n ∈ ω, there exists no p-morphism from any generated
subframe of the Fine frame onto Fn. In other words, Jankov formulas for
the entire sequence are satisfied in the Fine frame.
Proof. As above. ⊣
Theorem 11 Distinct subsets of natural numbers generate distinct interme-
diate logics whose axioms are δ, κ, bb2 and the Jankov formulas of those
frames from the sequence whose indices belong to a given subset of ω. All of
these logics are incomplete.
Proof. The fact that these logics are all distinct is a consequence of
lemmas 8 and 9. The fact that these logics are incomplete follows from
theorems 5 and lemmas 6 and 10 — a suitable inference rule is not admissible
in any of the logics. ⊣
I would like to thank Professor A. Wroński, the supervisor of my master’s
thesis, for his constant help and advice.
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